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Abstract
This paper deals with the interaction between polluting firms, tax
inspectors and politicians in a corrupted context. We construct a the-
oretical game model with incomplete information to discuss the effects
of such interaction on environmental policy. In this respect, we be-
lieve that the State may pursue environmental protection by employ-
ing two alternative strategies: on one hand, the State can, through
greater incentive for the tax inspector, increase the monitoring level
which reduces the evasion and, thus increases tax revenues (incentive
channel); on the other hand, the State can, through greater environ-
mental expenses, increase the compliance of the polluting firm which
means lower evasion and, thus greater tax revenues (compliance chan-
nel). Clearly, more environmental expenses mean, ceteris paribus, less
public resources for tax inspector’s incentive, and vice versa. In this
context, we demonstrate that for a country with a high (low) level of
incentives the incentive (compliance) channel is more efficient than the
compliance (incentive) channel.
Keywords: Game Theory, Corruption, Environmental Policy.
1 Introduction
Evidence suggests that the environment is affected by several economic fac-
tors. A wide number of authors focuses on the impact of energy consump-
tion, technological processes and, in general, human activities on pollution
and natural resources (see e.g. Tapiero, 2009; Bosetti et al., 2002; Cerqueti,
2013 and references therein). In this respect, a relevant role against envi-
ronmental protection is played by illegal behaviors, with a specific mention
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to corruption.
In general, corruption represents one of the most acknowledged enemies of
the development of a country. Empirical investigations show how the GDP
rate decreases as corruption increases (Mauro, 1995; Pellegrini and Ger-
lagh, 2006). It is also commonly accepted that bribe-maximizing politicians
and/or bureaucrats tend to employ resources in those activities which may
offer a less transparent management of funds, environmental protection be-
ing one of the most prominent examples (see e.g. Hessami, 2010; Cole, 2006;
Lopez and Mitra, 2000; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006).
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between public corruption and en-
vironmental deterioration. With this aim, we construct an economic setting
in which corruption diverts funds allocated for environmental programs to
private pockets through embezzlement and bribery. Rent seeking (embez-
zlement) by politicians is considered as exogenous in our model.
Our scientific basis is that corruption can take place only in presence of
interactions between the economic actors. Moreover, such interactions are
risky, in that a corrupted transaction may be detected by the authorities.
Therefore, the problem is here treated under a game theoretical perspective
with incomplete information. The interested reader is reminded to Moulin
(1986) and Mesterton-Gibbons (2000) for a survey of game theory with ap-
plications in economic and social sciences.
An important feature of our model is that corruption - lato sensu - may
occur at different levels (see also Wilson and Damania, 2005).
The players of the game are polluting firms (tax payers), environmental in-
spectors (tax inspectors) and politicians, and have the option to behave in
a corrupt manner. Specifically: on one hand, a polluting firm attempts to
reduce the amount of environmental taxes which it has to pay by bribing
a low level public official (environmental inspector) to make false reports
regarding emission levels. In this case, corruption interferes with monitor-
ing, enforcement, etc. Hence, more corruption unambiguously corresponds
with more pollution 1. On the other hand, a high level public official (a
politician) can embezzle part of the environmental revenues, diverting these
from environmental policies. The game is with incomplete information, in
that the emission level of the polluting firm is randomly determined by the
Nature.
By a purely mathematical perspective, some contributions linking game the-
ory and corruption have appeared in the literature (see e.g. Macrae, 1982,
Pasetta, 1999, Celentani and Ganuza, 2002, Cerqueti and Coppier, 2009,
2010, 2013 and Cerqueti et al., 2012). However, the aspects related to the
interconnections between corruption and environment have been quite ne-
1As stressed in the ESI 2005 report (Esty et al. 2005), ”corruption contributes to lax
enforcement of environmental regulations and an ability on the part of producers and
consumers to evade responsibility for the environmental harms they cause”.
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glected. A remarkable exception is Wilson and Damania (2005), where a
theoretical game model is proposed to discuss how corruption affects en-
vironmental policies. The main difference between our approach and the
quoted paper is that we here want to model the trade-off between different
sources of incentives to control corruption, including the ethical sense of the
tax payers. Differently, Wilson and Damania (2005) treat the important
problem of the role of political competition in fighting evasion and corrup-
tion. Specifically, we assume that when the polluting firm observes that
politicians direct the public revenues to the most embezzling activities, it
reacts by increasing its evasion rate. On the contrary, if politicians are not
corrupt, the polluting firm increases its compliance rates2.
In general, the models in literature dealing with States developing strategies
to improve fiscal performance have generally focused on the behavior of the
briber3. Suggested policies include augmenting penalties, lowering tax rates
and increasing the enforcement of fines. In this respect, we believe that the
State may pursue this scope by employing two alternatives strategies: on
one hand, the State can, through greater incentive for the tax inspector,
increase the monitoring level (incentive channel). Higher probability of be-
ing monitored means for the polluting firm, lesser incentive for evasion and,
thus greater tax revenues. Given the public budget constraint, more incen-
tives mean, ceteris paribus, less public resources for the environment (high
incentives for inspectors – low environmental expenses); on the other hand,
the State can, through greater environmental expenses, increase the com-
pliance of the polluting firm (compliance channel). Higher firm compliance
means lesser incentive for evasion and, thus greater tax revenues. Clearly,
given the public budget constraint, more environmental expenses mean, ce-
teris paribus, less public resources for tax inspector’s incentive (high level of
environmental expenses – low incentives)4.
As already discussed above, the mathematical model developed here is based
on interactions and competition among the economic agents. Therefore, it
allows us to capture the tension between such conflicting strategies in pur-
suing environmental protection, and assess the conditions for which one
channel is more effective than the other one.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we describe the timing of the game and provide the main results.
In Section 4, we analyze the relationship between environmental revenues
and the incentive scheme. Section 5 concludes. All proofs of Propositions
are in the Appendix.
2For a more detailed analysis on the efficient environmental tools, i.e. taxes or quotas,
see Sandmo (2002).
3See e.g. Andvig and Moene (1990).
4See, however, Flatters and MacLeod (1995), Haque and Sahay (1996) who consider
incentive effects but without explicit consideration of bonus rate, as done here. Our
approach is closer to that of Chand and Moene (1997).
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2 Theoretical model
As we said, we consider an economy composed of three players: polluting
firms (tax payers), environmental inspectors (tax inspectors) and politicians.
Hereafter we will refer to polluting firms as a single representative agent.
We consider a stylized model in which a firm emits pollution that the State
attempts to control through an emission tax rate t ∈ (0, 1). We consider
only the share of public budget relating to the environmental revenues and
environmental expenses5. The State cannot directly observe the level of pol-
lution emitted by the firm and, therefore, employs environmental inspectors
to check pollution levels in order to weed out or reduce environmental eva-
sion. The level of emissions is proportional to the firm’s production.
Nature decides the production of the polluting firm, and therefore the level
of emissions: y − e with probability p and y with probability 1 − p. In the
former case, the polluting firm reports the total pollution emission y − e,
while in the latter case the firm can decide to underreport its emissions by
the amount e. The environmental evasion can be discovered only if the pol-
luting firm is checked by an environmental inspector. In return for a fixed
wage (λ), the inspector could ascertain the emission level of the firm and
report this information to the State. But, we consider that there is a cost
of the effort of inspection ω > 0. Therefore, in order to push environmen-
tal inspectors to report evasion, the State introduce a bonus rate α ∈ [0, 1]
which the environmental inspector obtains on any reported evaded amount.
When the firm declares an emission level y, then the environmental inspec-
tor does not check it. Otherwise, if an amount of y − e is reported, then
the environmental inspector can proceed to the inspection. The inspector
who discovers environmental evasion decides whether to report it or to ask
for a bribe (bd): indeed, it is common knowledge that the environmental
inspector is corruptible and open to bribery, in the sense that it pursues its
own interest and not necessarily that of the State.
Differently from a wide part of literature which considers that each polluting
firm is visited by an environmental inspector, in our model the probability
for a polluting firm of being checked is endogenous and different from one6.
In fact, the inspector’s choice whether to check a polluting firm is based
on economic reasoning: the inspector decides whether to check or not de-
pending on the effort–cost of monitoring ω, and on the expected benefit of
reporting or not the evasion (the bonus rate α and the bribe, respectively.).
We assume that ω ≤ αet, i.e. the environmental inspector’s benefit from
reporting environmental evasion is higher than the cost of control.
Moreover, we assume that the fixed salary of the environmental inspector is
greater than the incentive of discovering corruption i.e. λ ≥ αet. Therefore,
5It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explore the environmental protection
policies performed by the State.
6See e.g. Mookherjee and Png (1995) and Damania (2002).
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the range of variation of α is in actual facts a restriction of [0, 1], and pre-
cisely: α ∈ [α, α¯], where α = ωet and α¯ = λet .
Since the focus of our research is to analyze the relationship between cor-
ruption and environmental quality, we consider only the share of the public
budget allocated to the environment. For this reason, in our model, the envi-
ronmental revenues are used only for environmental protection and emissions
abatement activities, along with the payment of environmental inspectors’
wages and of the incentives. In this respect, it is necessary to note that,
ceteris paribus, the amount of tax revenues allocated for environment pro-
tection decreases as the bonus rate α grows.
Furthermore, we assume that politicians -governing the State- are open to
corruption and embezzle a percentage β ∈ [0, 1] of the environmental rev-
enues. This statement is quite reasonable in that the expenditure in environ-
ment protection involves high technology investment on renewable energy
and/or abatement, and this leads to expenses that are not always transpar-
ent (see Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, 2000; Hessami, 2010).
There is an interaction between the State and the polluting firm, in that the
polluting firm has the awareness that the underreported emission is sub-
tracted to the expenses for environmental protection, and this generates a
disutility of evading (see Lapatinas et al., 2011, Hessami, 2010)7. Simulta-
neously, the polluting firm knows that a part of the environmental revenues
of the State is embezzled by the corrupt politicians, and this reduces the
moral incentive not to evade (see Spicer and Becker, 1980; Andvig and
Moene, 1990; Fortin et al., 2007; Scholtz and Lubell, 1998). In general,
from an economic point of view, tax morale should decreases with respect
to the political corruption level. Several studies support this assumption.
Specifically, Barone and Mocetti (2011) prove empirically that tax morale
increases with an efficient employment of resources, and implicitly state that
political corruption leads to less compliance tax payers. Torgler (2003) and
Everst-Philips and Sandall (2009) show the positive linkage between govern-
ment’s integrity and individuals’ tax compliance. Alm and Gomez (2008)
and Akpo (2009) states that government failure in providing good services
let citizens be reluctant to pay taxes.
Analogous arguments lead to the decreasing property of tax morale with
respect to α. Indeed, caeteris paribus, an augment of α means a lower level
of environmental protection. Therefore, the perception of the environmental
damage due to evasion is reduced. The percentages α and β are commonly
known by the polluting firm8.
To sum up, we introduce a cost-of-evading function associated to the pol-
7For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between firm’s compliance and envi-
ronmental regulation, see Nyborg and Telle (2006)
8While for α this statement is obvious, a proxy for β can be derived by looking at the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), constructed by Transparency International.
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luting firm9
c : [α, α¯]× [0, 1]2 × [0,+∞)→ [0, 1] : (α, β, t, e) 7→ c(α, β, t, e),
where c(α, β, t, e) is the cost of evasion for the polluting firm, and it rep-
resents the firm’s perception index of the environmental damage when the
bonus rate for the environmental inspector is α, the politicians’ embezzle-
ment percentage is β and the evaded amount is et. The costs c’s disregard
on the detection of the environmental evasion, and should be intended as
”moral costs”. By the arguments developed above, c(α, β, t, e) is assumed
to be decreasing with respect to α and β and increasing with respect to t
and e. It is worth stressing that c(α, β, t, e) is an economic cost and it does
not necessarily have to be measured through units of currency.
In the following, we assume explicitly that
c(α, β, t, e) = c(α, β)et. (1)
The definition in formula (1) formalizes that the cost-of-evading term is pro-
portional to the evaded amount with a proportionality factor dependent on
α and β.
We also assume perfect knowledge of the function c by all the actors playing
in this game, in the sense that there is an objective measure of the cost-of-
evading functions, that can be determined by the analysis of the behavior
of the polluting firm.
An explicit shape of function c will be provided only when it will turn out
to be useful to describe formally our optimization problems.
When evasion is detected, the environmental inspector can ask the polluting
firm for a bribe bd. By its perspective, the polluting firm could refuse the
bribe or accept to negotiate the amount of bd with the environmental inspec-
tor. If the environmental inspector reports the environmental evader, the
latter incurs punishment, which is a fine proportional to the evaded amount,
where m ∈ [0, 1] is the fine rate, while the former gains a bonus with rate α.
Of course, if reported, the firm does not pay the bribe but must pay taxes
ty, and is affected by the fine met.
3 The game: description and solution
Given the framework described above, we can formalize the economic prob-
lem into a five-period game with incomplete information.
For a clear exposition, we present the game in a stepwise form. The payoff
vector will be indicated with a triple
pi = (pi(F ), pi(S), pi(I)), (2)
9To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formalization in the literature of tax
morale in the environmental corruption context.
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where pi(F ), pi(S) and pi(I) represent the payoffs of the polluting firm, the
State10 and the environmental inspector, respectively.
First stage
Nature decides the amount of the firm’s emission, that is y − e with prob-
ability p and y with probability 1 − p. The former case will be labeled as
good state of Nature, while the latter as bad state of Nature, in accord with
the economic sense of low (high) level of emissions, i.e. low (high) level of
production. The two cases are analyzed separately.
Good state of Nature: emissions level y − e
Second stage
The polluting firm declares y − e.
Third stage
The inspector must decide whether to check the declared income or not to
check it. The game ends in both cases. The payoffs are:{
pi2 = ((1− t)(y − e), t(y − e)− λ, λ), if not checked;
pi4 = ((1− t)(y − e), t(y − e)− λ, λ− ω), if checked. (3)
Bad state of Nature: emissions level y
Second stage
The polluting firm must decide the amount of income to declare: y or y− e.
If the firm declares y, then the environmental inspector does not check the
firm and the game ends with the following payoff vector:
pi1 = ((1− t)y, ty − λ, λ). (4)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage three.
Third stage
If the polluting firm declares y − e, then it pays also the cost-of-evading
c(α, β)et. The environmental inspector must decide whether to check the
emission of the polluting firm or not to check it.
If the environmental inspector does not check the polluting firm, then the
game ends with the following payoff vector:
pi3 = (y − (y − e)t− c(α, β)et, t(y − e)− λ, λ). (5)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage four.
10The payoff of the State should be understood as the income from taxes net of the
bonus αet eventually paid to the inspector, of the fine met possibly paid by the detected
environmental evader and of the wage λ of the environmental inspectors.
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Fourth stage
If the environmental inspector checks the polluting firm, then it must decide
whether to report the environmental evasion or to ask for a bribe bd. If the
environmental inspector reports the evasion, then the game ends with the
following payoff vector:
pi5 = ((1− t)y −met, ty + (m− α)et− λ, λ− ω + αet). (6)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage five.
Fifth stage
If the environmental inspector asks the polluting firm for a bribe bd > 0,
then the firm must decide whether to negotiate such a bribe or refuse the
negotiation. When the bribe is refused by the firm, then the game ends with
the following payoff vector:
pi6 = ((1− t)y −met, ty + (m− α)et− λ, λ− ω + αet). (7)
If the polluting firm accepts to negotiate the bribe, then the negotiation
starts and the two parties will find an agreement on the bribe bNB, which
corresponds to the Nash solution to a bargaining game. The polluting firm
pays the bribe and it is not reported, and the game ends with the payoff
vector given by:
pi7 = (y − (y − e)t− bNB − c(α, β)et, t(y − e)− λ, λ− ω + bNB). (8)
We provide an explicit expression of the bribe bNB.
Proposition 3.1. There is a unique bribe bNB, as the Nash solution to the
bargaining game, given by:
bNB =
1
2
· [1− c(α, β) + α+m]et. (9)
We now formalize the solution of the game, which has been derived by using
the backward induction method starting from the last stage.
Proposition 3.2. There exist four numbers p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] and M1,M2 ∈
[0,+∞), defined as in (28), (41), (22) and (26), respectively, such that the
following cases hold.
(I) Assume that c(α, β) + α > 1.
(I-a) If 1− p ≤ p1, then:
(I-a.1) if m ≤M2, the game ends with random payoff vector
piA =
{
pi3 with probability 1− p,
pi2 with probability p;
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(I-a.2) if m > M2, the game ends with random payoff vector
piB =
{
pi1 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(I-b) If 1− p > p1, then the game ends with random payoff vector piB.
(II) Assume that c(α, β) + α ≤ 1.
(II-a) If 1− p ≤ p2, then:
(II-a.1) if m ≤M2, the game ends with random payoff vector piA;
(II-a.2) if m > M2, the game ends with random payoff vector piB.
(II-b) If 1− p > p2, then:
(II-b.1) if m ≤M2, the game ends with random payoff vector piA;
(II-b.2) if M2 < m ≤ −M1, the game ends with random payoff vector
piC =
{
pi7 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(II-b.3) if m > −M1, the game ends with random payoff vector piB.
It is worth noting that the thresholds M1 and M2, defined respectively
in (22) and (26), depend on the parameters α and β. Substantially, the fine
rate thresholds are adequate to the levels β of the corrupt politicians and α
of the environmental revenues devoted to the payment of the bonus to the
environmental inspector. In the formulas we should correctly write:
M1 ≡M1(α, β), M2 ≡M2(α, β). (10)
Analogously, we should write
p1 ≡ p1(α), p2 ≡ p2(α, β). (11)
It is not necessary to report in this section the explicit reference to α and β
of the p’s and the M ’s, which will be reintroduced in the section devoted to
the analysis of the environmental revenues.
Furthermore, Proposition 3.2 highlights also that the game involves the ac-
tive interaction between the polluting firm and environmental inspectors.
Such an interaction leads to different perfect bayesian equilibria, which de-
pend on the values assumed by the parameters. The main distinction to per-
form is the one associated to the aggregation of the cost-of-evading c(α, β)
and bonus rate α. Such a distinction is based on the aggregate strength of
the ”enemies of evasion”, which is high in the case of c(α, β) + α > 1 and
low otherwise. A further distinction is that concerning the occurrence of the
good or bad state of Nature and that related to the amount of the fine rate
m.
If the emission of the polluting firm is y− e, two equilibria without environ-
mental evasion occur:
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• pi2 is associated to the equilibrium with no check.
• pi4 is associated to the equilibrium with check.
When the emission of the polluting firm is y, then three equilibria occur:
• pi1 is associated to the equilibrium with no environmental evasion.
• pi3 is associated to the equilibrium with undetected environmental eva-
sion;
• pi7 is associated to the equilibrium with environmental evasion and
fiscal corruption.
To provide a comment on the results listed in Proposition 3.2, it is worth
focusing only on the case of occurrence of the bad state of Nature. For the
sake of clarity, we repeat the distinction used in Proposition 3.2.
(I) Suppose that the value of the aggregation of the cost-of-evading func-
tion and the bonus rate is high. In this case the evasion is strongly
contrasted by the aggregation of the incentive schemes for the inspec-
tors and of the costs sustained by the evaders.
(I-a) Suppose that the occurrence of the bad state of Nature is rather
improbable.
(I-a.1) If the fine rate is small, then the polluting firm is not scared
about the punishment. Moreover, the bribe is small as well,
in that it is proportional to the fine rate. Hence, the polluting
firm underreports its emission. The environmental inspector
does not check the polluting firm, basically for two reasons:
in the one end, since the fine rate is small and the bribe
goes hand in hand with the fine rate, then also the eventual
bribe would be small; on the other, the probability that the
emission y− e is that effectively gained by the polluting firm
is so high that there is a concrete risk of a non useful effort
in checking.
(I-a.2) If the fine rate is high, then the polluting firm is worried
about the punishment or the amount of the bribe and finds
it worthwhile to report its emission. The environmental in-
spector checks the polluting firm, because the fine rate is so
high that the bribe is great enough to incentive the effort of
checking.
(I-b) Suppose that the probability of the occurrence of the bad state
of Nature is high.
In this case, the bad state of Nature is so probable that the in-
spector finds it worthwhile to check the emission of the polluting
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firm and the firm finds it worthwhile to avoid the probable en-
vironmental inspector’s actions by reporting its emission. This
behavior is supported also by the high value of the sum between
α and c(α, β), that means that there is a discouragement for the
polluting firm to evade and an encouragement for the inspector
to check.
(II) Now, suppose that the value of the aggregation of the cost-of-evading
function and the bonus rate is low. Evasion is facilitated by the low
level of the aggregation of the incentive schemes for the inspectors and
of the costs sustained by the evaders.
(II-a) Suppose that there is a high probability of the occurrence of the
good state of Nature.
(II-a.1) If the fine rate is small, then the polluting firm finds it worth-
while to evade taxes and, if detected, to agree on the small
bribe. The bribe is so small that the environmental inspector
does not find it worthy to inspect the polluting firm.
(II-a.2) If the fine rate is high, then the punishment and the bribe are
too high and the polluting firm finds it worthwhile to report
its emission. The environmental inspector checks the pollut-
ing firm, for the same reasons listed in case (I-a.2) which are
amplified in this case.
(II-b) Suppose that the probability of the occurrence of the bad state
of Nature is quite high.
(II-b.1) If the fine rate is small, then the same arguments of case
(II-a.1) apply, and we are in the situation of no checked un-
derreported income.
(II-b.2) If the fine rate is medium, then the bribe is still low enough
to convince the polluting firm to underreport its emission.
By the perspective of the environmental inspector, the bribe
is so high that it is worthwhile to check the emission of the
polluting firm.
(II-b.3) If the fine rate is high, then the polluting firm finds it worth-
while to report its emission because of the high amounts of
fine and bribe and due to the high probability to be checked
by the environmental inspector. The bribe is so high that
the environmental inspector finds it worthwhile to check the
polluting firm, and this confirms the case (II-b.2).
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4 Optimization of the expected environmental rev-
enues
In this section we focus on the expected environmental revenues of the State.
The randomness of the environmental revenues is grounded on the evidence
that the polluting firm may experience an emissions level y with probability
1− p or y − e with probability p.
Proposition 3.2 implicitly states three important facts regarding the income
of the State.
Firstly, the environmental revenues of the State depends on the value of the
aggregation of cost-of-evading function and bonus rate. This is the formal-
ization of the existence of a relationship between the strength of the enemies
of evasion and the environmental revenues.
Secondly, the expected aggregate environmental revenues depend on the
probability of occurrence of the bad state of Nature.
Thirdly, the aggregate environmental revenues vary according to the amount
of the fine paid by the reported polluting firm. In this respect, it is here
necessary to highlight the dependence of the thresholds M1 and M2, defined
respectively in (22), and (26), on α and β. Hence, M1 and M2 will be inter-
preted hereafter as in (10). Analogously, p1 and p2 will be read as in (11).
As already preannounced above, in order to analyze the environmental ex-
pected revenues of the State, it now turns out to be useful to provide an
explicit expression for the cost-of-evading function c(α, β). A suitable choice
is to assume:
c(α, β) = exp{−α(β + 1)}. (12)
Under definition (12), the function c(α, β) decreases with respect to α and β
and c(α, β) ∈ [0, 1], for each α ∈ [α, α¯] and β ∈ [0, 1]. We proceed hereafter
by replacing c(α, β) with its expression in formula (12).
From (12), the critical condition of Proposition 3.2, namely c(α, β) +α > 1,
can be rewritten in terms of an inequality involving α and β as follows:
β <
− log(1− α)
α
− 1. (13)
Remark 4.1. Evidently, the term − log(1−α)α − 1 in (13) does not belong
always to [0, 1]. As an example, − log(1−α)α − 1 > 1 as α approaches to 1. In
this particular case, condition in (13) is trivially satisfied. Differently, if α
is close to zero, a Taylor expansion leads to
− log(1− α)
α
− 1 ∼ −α− α
2
−α − 1 = α ∈ (0, 1).
In this case (13) is fulfilled only by some values of β. In all the cases, the
analysis carried out throughout the paper maintains its validity.
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Now, denote by r(α, β) the contribution given by the representative pol-
luting firm to the environmental revenues. Proposition 3.2 leads straight-
forward to an explicit expression for r(α, β):
Proposition 4.2. Consider (α, β) ∈ [α, α¯]× [0, 1] and introduce the follow-
ing subset of [0, 1]2:
A(α, β) =

A1(α, β), if (13) holds;
A2(α, β), if (13) does not hold,
(14)
where
A1(α, β) =
{[
1− ω
αet
, 1
]
×
(
2ω
et(1− p) + exp{−α(β + 1)} − α− 1, 1
]
∪
∪
[
0, 1− ω
αet
]
× [0, 1]
}
∩ [0, 1]2; (15)
and
A2(α, β) =
{[
1− ω
et[1− exp{−α(β + 1)}] , 1
]
×
(
2ω
et(1− p) + exp{−α(β + 1)} − α− 1, 1
]
∪
∪
[
0, 1− ω
et[1− exp{−α(β + 1)}]
]
× (1− exp{−α(β + 1)} − α, 1]
}
∩ [0, 1]2.
(16)
Then
r(α, β) =

(1− β)ty, if (p,m) ∈ A(α, β);
(1− β)t(y − e), if (p,m) /∈ A(α, β),
(17)
The set A(α, β) may be interpreted as the region where no evasion oc-
curs.
The expected value of the contribution of the representative environmental
payer when α and β are fixed is:
pi(α, β) = p(1− β)t(y − e) + (1− p)r(α, β), (18)
where r(α, β) is defined as in (17).
4.1 The optimization problem
We consider the case in which the State aims at maximizing the total ex-
pected environmental revenues. To this aim, each contribution pi(α, β) in
(18) should be maximized with respect to α. The percentage of embezzle-
ment β is assumed to be maintained by the corrupt Government, and it
represents an exogenous parameter of the model.
It is important to note that α produces two contrasting effects in the fight
against environmental evasion:
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1 Positive effect. On the one hand, a higher level of α increases the
incentive for the environmental inspector to control environmental eva-
sion. This happens because a higher level of α means a higher bonus
if the inspector denounces the detected evasion, but at the same time,
it means a greater bribe for the inspector who does not report the
detected evasion. So, through this effect, a higher level of α means
less incentive for environmental evasion and, ceteris paribus, more en-
vironmental revenues.
2 Negative Effect. On the other hand, a higher level of α means, ce-
teris paribus, fewer resources devoted to the environment and therefore
a lower cost of evasion (c) for the polluting firm. So a higher level of
α implies, trough this channel, a higher evasion and, ceteris paribus,
lower environmental revenues.
The optimization problem can be formalized as follows:
Problem P1
Fix β ∈ [0, 1]. We search for the optimal bonus rate α?β such that:
pi(α?β, β) = sup
α∈[α,α¯]
pi(α, β) (19)
By formula (18), Problem P1 is equivalent to the following:
Problem P1′
Fix β ∈ [0, 1]. We search for the optimal bonus rate α?β such that:
|A(α?β, β)| = sup
α∈[α,α¯]
|A(α, β)|, (20)
where | • | denotes the measure of the bi-dimensional set •.
A closed-form theoretical result for solving Problem P1′ is contained in the
following statement:
Proposition 4.3. Assume that α > 1−p2 . Then both |A1(α, β)| and |A2(α, β)|
increase with respect to α, for each β ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4.3 offers some insights on the size of the honesty region,
and hence on the environmental revenues. If the lower level of the bonus
rate is high enough, then the State should incentivize the monitoring activity
to efficiently fight evasion. The meaning of this outcome lies in the defini-
tion of the cost function, which decreases with respect to α. Indeed, if the
monitoring activity is rather high, then the public expenditure for the envi-
ronment is so low that pollutant firms do not judge convenient to pay taxes
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for environmental protection and evade. The unique way to reduce evasion
is then to implement a more stringent monitoring activity by incrementing
α. The threshold 1−p2 grows with the probability of the occurrence of the
bad state of Nature. Basically, the pollutant firms seem to be more tolerant
to a reduction of funds for the environmental protection when the pollution
emission is high. In this case, therefore, the former (positive) effect of α
prevails on the negative one. In fact, as α grows the greater level of control
pushes the polluting firms to evade less, and therefore, the State will have
greater environmental revenues.
Unfortunately, a closed form result is not available for the case α ≤ 1−p2 .
Moreover, in the context we are dealing with, simulations appear to us non
exhaustive, being the parameter set involved in our theoretical model too
wide. However, we can proceed by simulations with the specific aim to test
if the result of Proposition 4.3 can be reverted when α is small.
The used dataset consists in: ω = 1, λ = 2, e = 1000, t = 0.4. These val-
ues have a clear justification in standard economic theory and in important
references. The effort of inspecting ω can be interpreted as the marginal
disutility of labor, which must be reasonably smaller than the wage. In the
numerical experiments, we then state the theoretical hypothesis of a wage
doubling the disutility of labor. The amount of evasion of the firm can be
taken several times larger than the wage of a single individual, and this ex-
plains the choice of e = 1000. The only parameter which should be better
contextualized in the literature is, to our opinion, the tax rate t. In this
respect, it is worth pointing out that the value t = 0.4 has been adopted by
several important environmental researches (see e.g. Goulder et al., 1999;
Parry et al., 1999; West and Williams, 2004).
The probability p is assumed to vary in a range [0, 0.99]. This parameter
set implies that α < 1−p2 . We consider a country with a fair level of political
corruption, and assume β = 0.5. The plot of the surface z = |A(α, β)| drawn
with respect to α and p is reported in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Caption: The surface z = |A(α, β)| drawn with respect to α and p.
Figure 1 provides some interesting suggestions. We note that, once p has
been fixed, the surface |A(α, β)| decreases with respect to α. This evidence
meets our basic requirement, which was to test if the result of Proposi-
tion 4.3 may be reverted for α ≤ 1−p2 . Hence, a lower level of monitoring
activity rather small may lead to the strategy for which the State should
increment the expenses for environmental protection to achieve a greater
level of expected environmental revenues. This outcome is due to the costs
that pollutant firms pay in evading, which are particularly relevant when
the level of environmental funds are high. In this case, when the minimum
level of α is low enough, i.e. α ≤ 1−p2 , the negative effect of α prevails on
the positive one. As α increases, the evasion increases too and, therefore,
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the environmental revenues decrease. Thus, the State must fix a low level
of bonus rate α, in order to maximize the environmental revenues.
To sum up, two perspectives can be compared. On the one hand, a policy-
maker who fixes a small maximum level to the expenses for environmental
protection (case α > 1−p2 ) must be aware that the only way to fight evasion
is to implement a growing level of monitoring activity (hence, reducing the
funds for the environment). On the other hand, a large maximum level of
expenses for environmental protection may lead to a more ethical route -
based on the cost-of-evading functions of the pollutant firms- to fight evasion,
which drives the policymaker toward an improvement of the environmental
expenses.
5 Conclusion
In our paper, we develop and solve a theoretical game model with incom-
plete information to examine the interaction between polluting firms, envi-
ronmental inspectors and politicians. In our model, each of these players
have the option to behave in a corrupt manner and their interaction has
an effect on environmental protection. To be more precise, on one hand, a
polluting firm attempts to reduce the amount of environmental taxes which
it has to pay by bribing a low level public official (environmental inspector)
to make false reports regarding emission levels; on the other hand, a high
level public official (a politician) can embezzle part of the environmental
revenues, diverting these from environmental policies. We consider the case
in which the State aims at maximizing the total expected environmental
revenues. In doing this, the State employs two conflicting strategies based
on punishment (high incentives for inspectors and, consequently, low level
of environmental expenses) or on polluting firms compliance (high level of
environmental expenses and, consequently, low incentives). We find that
the effect of bonus rate in reducing evasion is ambiguous. In fact, if the
State fixes a high minimum incentive level, the only way to fight evasion
is to implement a growing level of monitoring activity (hence, reducing the
funds for the environment). Conversely, a low minimum incentive threshold
for the environmental inspector may lead to a more ethical route - based on
the cost-of-evading functions of the pollutant firms - to fight evasion, which
drives the policy maker toward an improvement of the fiscal performance.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let φ
∆
=
(
φ
(E)
∆ , φ
(I)
∆
)
be the vector of the differences in the payoffs between
the case of agreement and disagreement regarding the bribe between the
polluting firm and the environmental inspector, i.e.
φ
(E)
∆ = pi
(E)
7 − pi(E)6 , φ(I)∆ = pi(I)7 − pi(I)6 .
We assume that polluting firm and environmental inspector have equal
power in bargaining. Hence, follow the generalized Nash bargaining the-
ory, the bribe of agreement comes out from max
b∈[0,+∞)
φ
(E)
∆ · φ(I)∆ , i.e.:
max
b∈[0,+∞)
[et(1− c(α, β) +m)− b] · [b− αet] . (21)
The objective function in (21) is a reversed U-shaped quadratic function in
b. Therefore, the first order condition leads to the bribe of agreement bNB
as in (9), which is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The static game is solved using backward induction, which enables the equi-
libria to be obtained.
(5) At stage five, the polluting firm negotiates the bribe if and only if
pi
(E)
7 −pi(E)6 > 0, which is verified when the amount of the fine satisfies
the following inequality:
m > M1 ≡ c(α, β) + α− 1. (22)
(4) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage four the environmental
inspector decides whether to ask for a bribe or not.
(4.1) if m > M1 is verified, then the bribe is requested by the environ-
mental inspector if and only if pi
(I)
7 − pi(I)5 > 0, which is always
true.
(4.2) if m ≤M1, then environmental inspector’s payoffs are equivalent
in both of cases of requested or not requested bribe, and so s/he
will avoid to ask for the bribe.
(3) At stage three, polluting firm declares y − e and environmental in-
spector must decide whether to inspect her/his income or not. This
decision is driven by the expected payoffs, in that the environmental
inspector does not know whether the income of the polluting firm is y
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or y − e.
Denote as pi
(I)
C and pi
(I)
NC the random variables associated to the pay-
off of the environmental inspector when checking or not checking the
polluting firm, respectively.
Environmental inspector checks the polluting firm if and only if
E[pi
(I)
C ]−E[pi(I)NC ] > 0, (23)
where E is the expected value operator and
E[pi
(I)
NC ] = ppi
(I)
2 + (1− p)pi(I)3 = λ. (24)
(3.1) If m > M1, then
E[pi
(I)
C ] = ppi
(I)
4 + (1− p)pi(I)7 =
= p(λ−ω)+(1−p)
[
λ− ω + 1
2
· (1− c(α, β) + α+m)et
]
. (25)
Therefore, condition (23) is equivalent to:
m > M2 ≡ 1
et
· 2ω
1− p + c(α, β)− α− 1. (26)
(3.2) If m ≤M1, then
E[pi
(I)
C ] = ppi
(I)
4 +(1−p)pi(I)5 = p(λ−ω)+(1−p)(λ−ω+αet). (27)
Therefore, condition (23) is equivalent to:
1− p > p1 ≡ ω
αet
. (28)
(2) At stage two the polluting firm must decide whether to underreport
her/his income.
The case with production y−e is trivial, while if the income is y, then
the decision is driven by the payoffs.
Now, suppose that the income of the polluting firm is y, i.e. the bad
state of the Nature occurs. Denote as pi
(E)
R and pi
(E)
NR the payoff of the
polluting firm when reporting y or y − e, respectively.
Pollution firm reports her/his income if and only if
pi
(E)
R − pi(E)NR > 0, (29)
where
pi
(E)
R = pi
(E)
1 = (1− t)y. (30)
For evaluating pi
(E)
NR, we need to distinguish some cases.
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(2.1) If one of the following two cases occurs:{
M1 < m ≤M2;
m ≤M1 and 1− p ≤ p1, (31)
then:
pi
(E)
NR = pi
(E)
3 = y − t(y − e)− c(α, β)et. (32)
By (30) and (32), condition (29) becomes:
et[c(α, β)− 1] > 0,
that is never verified, being c(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]. The game ends with
random payoff {
pi3 with probability 1− p,
pi2 with probability p.
(33)
(2.2) If m > max{M1,M2}, then:
pi
(E)
NR = pi
(E)
7 = y− (y− e)t− c(α, β)et−
1
2
· [1− c(α, β) +α+m]et.
(34)
By (30) and (34), we can rewrite condition (29) as follows:
m > −M1 ≡ 1− c(α, β)− α. (35)
If (35) is true, then the game ends with random payoff{
pi1 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p;
(36)
If (35) is not satisfied, then the game ends with random payoff{
pi7 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(37)
(2.3) If m ≤M1 and 1− p > p1, then:
pi
(E)
NR = pi
(E)
5 = y(1− t)−met. (38)
By (30) and (38), condition (29) is trivially verified, as expected.
The game ends with random payoff{
pi1 with probability 1− p,
pi4 with probability p.
(39)
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to apply some simple algebra and
notice that: 
M1 > M2 if and only if 1− p > p1;
M1 > 0 if and only if c(α, β) + α > 1;
−M1 > M2 if and only if 1− p > p2,
(40)
where
p2 =
ω
et(1− c) . (41)
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
(i) By formula (15) we have
|A1(α, β)| = ω
αet
·
[
1 + α− exp{−α(β + 1)} − 2ω
et(1− p)
]
+ 1. (42)
Hence:
∂|A1(α, β)|
∂α
=
ω
αet
·
{
(β + 1) exp{−α(β + 1)}+ 1
α
[
exp{−α(β + 1)}+ 2ω
et(1− p) − 1
]}
>
>
ω
αet
·
{
(β + 1) exp{−α(β + 1)}+ 1
α
[
−α+ 2ω
et(1− p)
]}
, (43)
where the last inequality of (43) follows from being (13) true.
Under the hypothesis that α > 1−p2 , the right-hand side of (43) is
greater than 0, and this gives the required thesis.
(ii) Formula (16) gives:
|A2(α, β)| = ω
et[1− exp{−α(β + 1)}] ·
[
1− exp{−α(β + 1)} − ω
et(1− p)
]
+exp{−α(β+1)}+α.
(44)
Therefore:
∂|A2(α, β)|
∂α
= (β+1) exp{−α(β+1)}·
[
2ω2
(et)2(1− p)(1− exp{−α(β + 1)})2 − 1
]
+1.
(45)
A simple computation assures the following inequalities:
2α
1−p >
2α2
1−p
(1− exp{−α(β + 1)})2 < 1.
Thus, by the hypothesis, we have
2ω2
(et)2(1− p)(1− exp{−α(β + 1)})2 − 1 > 0,
and this implies the thesis.
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